| 關 鍵 詞： |
規則 10b-5；優先承購權；法律上因果關係；侵權求償法；1934 年證券交易法 Section 10；證券詐欺；信賴；公平價值；真實價值 |
| 中文摘要： |
AUC 案：若未經美國政府同意時，依法不可對其提起訴訟。當事人主張，政府的同意已存在於 25 U.S.C. § 345。Section 345（第 345 條）規定僅適用於「分配訴訟」因此，我們判決 Section 345 於此並不適用。
Reyos 案：1961 年 8 月 26 日公告後，政府與混血族人間之託管及限制性財產的監管關係終止。此等股份之上，已無政府公權力存在；政府既已不得行使公權力，其應無須就未禁止股份轉讓一事負責。
曾有法院表示，1934 年證券交易法及其相關法規，有一個「重大的目的……以完全揭露的法理取代買者當心（caveat emptor）的原則，在證券市場樹立更高的商業倫理。」前揭法院提及國會希望證券的立法可以避免詐欺，能夠「不機械及侷限，而彈性」的解釋之。
更明確的說，Rule 10b-5 之第二款係明文規定，就重大事實作不實陳述及隱匿重大事實；第一款及第三款則未作如此狹窄的規定。被告計劃並誘使出賣人出售其持股，而未向其揭露應可影響其出售決定的重大事實，其行為已構成以「商業活動」、「方法、計劃或技巧」詐欺印第安籍出賣人。
本案主要係有關未盡揭露義務之行為，並無積極證明「信賴」要件存在的必要；只要被告所隱匿的事實係屬重大，一個理性投資人認為該資訊對其投資決定具有重要性即可。有此揭露義務存在，及隱匿重大事實之行為即符合因果關係的要件。
我們認為正確的損害計算方式是：所有出賣人所取得的公平價值與若無詐欺行為時其應取得的公平價值，兩者間之差額。被告所獲得之利益高於出賣人之實際損失時，則例外以被告所獲得利益總額作為損害額。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
Rule 10b-5；first refusal right；proximate cause；Tort Claims Act；Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934；securities fraud；reliance；fair value；true value |
| 英文摘要： |
（The United States, of course, may not be sued without its consent. The consent, it is claimed, exists in 25 U.S.C. § 345. Section 345 authorizes, and provides governmental consent for, only actions for allotment. We therefore readily conclude that § 345 has no application here.）
（The proclamation of August 26, 1961, this marked the termination of federal supervision over the trust and restricted property of the mixed-bloods. There was no remaining governmental authority over those shares. And without such authority there can be no liability on the part of the United States for failure to restrain a sale.）
（The Court has said that the 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments n15 embrace a “fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” In the case just cited the Court noted that Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”）
（To be sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact. The first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted. These defendants’ activities, outlined above, disclose, within the very language of one or the other of those subparagraphs, a “course of business” or a “device, scheme, or artifice” that operated as a fraud upon the Indian sellers.）
（Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision. This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.）
（In our view, the correct measure of damages is the difference between the fair value of all that the mixed-blood seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct, except for the situation where the defendant received more than the seller’s actual loss. In the latter case damages are the amount of the defendant’s profit.）
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判決要旨
關鍵詞
事實
判決
理由
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