| 關 鍵 詞： |
企業集團；企業集團化；跨越行使權利；關係企業；完全從屬公司；內部監控；財產權理論 |
| 中文摘要： |
就我國企業集團之監控法制而言，偏重在從屬公司少數股東及債權人之保護，而著重於規範控制公司濫用控制力而使從屬公司為不合營業常規之行為、控制公司之民事責任、關係企業之資訊公開及控制公司權利行使之限制等問題，顯然未以整體企業集團為對象以建構內部監控法制。在傳統之財產權概念下，控制公司股東僅為控制公司股份之所有權人，並未直接所有控制公司及從屬公司之營業或財產，而僅雙重間接所有從屬公司之營業或財產。因此，控制公司之股東會（股東）及監督機關（監察人或審計委員會之獨立董事成員），並無法直接參與從屬公司之重大經營事項之決策及監督。反之，控制公司之負責人在私利誘因下，卻可能透過其對從屬公司之指揮權限，進行利益輸送或不當經營，以規避控制公司股東會之監督。
又在公司法人格獨立理論之下，不僅企業集團各成員係獨立存在，且亦獨立於其股東及經營者而存在。我國現行公司法原則上係以單一公司法人為對象而建構其內部監控機制，顯然無法適度因應企業集團化衍生之負面效果。因此，本文透過比較法制之研究，除介紹美國及日本公司法制之理論發展及改革動向外，並從法學解釋之方法、控制關係理論、合併財務基礎理論及財產權理論等角度，試圖建構我國改革關係企業內部監控法制之理論基礎。最後，並從強化企業集團內部監控機制之觀點出發，主張從屬公司之基礎性變更若對於整體企業集團之影響達到重大性程度者，應保障控制公司之股東會（股東）參與決策之機會，而提升至控制公司之股東會（股東）決定。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
corporate groups；megasubsidiaries；pass-through rights；affiliated entities；the wholly owned subsidiary；internal governance；property doctrine |
| 英文摘要： |
In the legal monitoring system of corporate groups of our country, we put much more emphasis on the protection of minority stock holders and creditors of subsidiary companies, and we also focus on the arms- length transactions or irregular behaviors of subsidiary companies which were caused by the abuse of parent corporation’ power, the civil responsibilities of the parent corporation, the information disclosure of affiliated entities, and the limitation of parent corporation’ rights. However, we neglect a problem of internal control of the whole corporate group. In the traditional conception of the property doctrine, the shareholders of the parent corporation are only the owners of the shares of the parent corporation, they cannot directly control business operation or properties of both parent and subsidiary companies, and they can just indirectly own the business operation or properties of all the subsidiary companies second handedly. It is critical that the shareholders’ meeting (shareholders) and the organizations of supervision (auditors, or members of independent director inside auditors committee) of the parent corporation will not be able to vote or supervision of subsidiary companies’ major business operation directly. On the contrary, the directors or officers of the parent corporation might operate improper profits delivery or dishonest business decision to avoid the surveillance of the shareholders’ meeting of the parent corporation through the controlling and directing power toward the subsidiary companies.
As a general matter under corporate law-- the Doctrine of Separate Corporate Existence, a corporation is treated as an independent legal entity with a separate existence from its shareholders, management, and subsidiaries. The Taiwanese company law seems ignore the trend of “conglomerate corporate enterprises and so-called megasubsidiaries,” which undoubtedly results in some dilution of shareholder voting power, and establish the internal control regime on basis of a single corporation. These potential adverse effects could create significant costs that ultimately harm shareholders of corporations in Taiwan. As such, determination of which shareholders are entitled to a vote to authorize a sale of substantially all of the parent corporation’s assets held under a subsidiary is critical. This Article make a breakthrough in the context of the methodology of law interpretation, the theory of control, the theory of conglomerated financial basis, and the property doctrine, and establish the requirements and theory basis to disregard the separate corporate existence. Secondly, this Article reviews the legislation examples and developments of practical operation of advanced countries like U.S.A and Japan, and to confer whether the material transaction effectuated by a subsidiary should voted on by the shareholders’ meeting of the parent corporation. Finally, in considering the comparative analysis of American and Japanese company laws, this Article adopts the approach is to treat the subsidiary and the parent as one entity, thus when the transaction effectuated by a subsidiary constitute of corporate group’s fundamental and material change, need a vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation.
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| 目 次： |
壹：前言
貳：權力下放 v. 權力上提：控制公司股東會權限之合理擴張
一、美國公司法制之發展現況
（一）學說見解之發展
（二）模範商業公司法之立法例
（三）各州之公司立法及法院見解
二、日本公司法制之發展現況
（一）學說見解之發展
（二）會社法之立法例
三、我國公司法制之啟發
（一）理論建構之背景
（二）理論模式之建構
參：妥當性 v. 安定性：控制公司股東會跨越行使之規範模式
一、表決權跨越行使之規範基礎
（一）模式 I：企業集團合併基礎之法定
（二）模式 II：企業集團自治機制之法定
二、表決權跨越行使之範圍及界限
（一）決議事項
（二）交易安全
肆：結論與建議
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