| 關 鍵 詞： |
公司治理；外部董事；獨立董事；受託義務；注意義務；忠實義務；誠信義務；團體迷思 |
| 中文摘要： |
近年來，美國公司治理模式的移植已經在世界各地蔚為風潮。在法制移植的過程中，「外部董事」的設置與「受託義務」的概念常被認為是不可或缺的環節。然而，過度強調受託義務的重要性，可能使得潛在的外部董事候選人怯於接受職務，也可能使得擔任外部蓋事者產生強烈的風險趨避的態度，而不利於公司股東利益之極大化，此一情形使得外部董事的法制移植變得更為困難。
著眼於美國公司治理法制的精神，以及外部董事與監察人並存的公司監控模式，本丈提出「外部董事免責」制度作為法制移植的策略。本文認為若能減免外部蓋事的法定義務與責任，將促使外部董事資格嚴謹化，而受託義務在實務上的適用也能更加明確。此外，外部董事與監察人兩個公司內部監控的機制也能有效地予以區隔，不僅消除疊床架屋之弊，更能收互補其短之效。經由這樣的改變，本文相信移植的外部董事制度不僅能在我國生根、茁壯，更能確實強化我國現有的公司治理機制。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
corporate governance；outside director；independent director；fiduciary duty；duty of care；duty of loyalty；duty of good faith；groupthink |
| 英文摘要： |
In recent years, borrowing American legal model of corporate governance has emerged as a global trend. The institution of outside director and the concept of fiduciary duty are always deemed the indispensable pieces in the process of legal transplant. However, what is often ignored is the divergence between the standard of conduct and the standard of review in terms of directors' fiduciary duty. Overemphasize the importance of fiduciary duty in the borrowing countries might deter the potential candidates for outside director from taking these positions. And those who already hold the positions would therefore become strong risk-averse and tend to make conservative decisions without keeping close eye on the maximization of shareholder welfare. The side-effect of strong fiduciary duty would make it even more difficult to effectively import the institution of outside director.
In view of the spirit of American corporate governance system and the potential conflict between outside director and supervisor, a proposal of “no liability for outside director” is made in this article as a strategy aimed to successfully transplant the legal institutions. With the introduction of eliminating or limiting the liability of outside director, the qualifications for obtaining the positions could be greatly enhanced and the practical application of fiduciary duty principle simplified. Furthermore, this proposal offers various justifications for the simultaneous existence of outside director and supervisor. It is believed that, with the “no liability” rule and other complementary measures in place, a new set of legal institutions would function much better than Taiwan’s current corporate governance system.
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| 目 次： |
壹、前言：外部董事與公司治理模式的統一？
貳、董事權積在美國公司法制上的發展
一、董事會的定位與組成：外部董事及其獨立性
二、董事之受託義務與責任：形式與實質的重大差異
（一）注意義務
（二）忠實義務
（三）誠信義務
（四）其他責任減免機制：支出補償與保險
（五）小結：受託義務的存在意義與功能？
三、外部董事義務、責任差異化？
參、董事權責在我國公司法制上的演化
一、經營機制：從股東會至上到董事會集權
二、監督機制：外部董事制度的引進與受託義務的強化
三、董事法制移植的衝突與隱憂
（一）受託義務及責任規範具體落實的尺度
（二）責任減免機制的非同步輸入
（三）外部董事與監察人間的潛在衝突
（四）外部董事的資格界定與人數規定
肆、外部董事免責論
一、「外部董事免責」的思考緣起：法制移植的（階段性？）策略
二、「外部董事免責」的預期效益
（一）外部董事自主性的提升－資格嚴謹化與比例的增加
（二）受託義務的落實－內部董事監控的強化
（三）公司監控機制的區隔－與監察人的互補
三、「外部董事免責」疑慮的澄清：外部董事是否會盡忠職守？
四、「外部董事免責」的制度規劃
（一）立法論的思考方向
（二）解釋論的可能性
伍、結語
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