| 關 鍵 詞： |
經理人報酬；公司治理；經理人報酬結構；報酬委員會；報酬揭露；報酬監督；股東提案權 |
| 中文摘要： |
我國有關經理人報酬之相關法律規定十分簡單，且相關法律文章討論極少。此或許一方面由於我國經理人報酬之數額，相較於美國經理人報酬之天文數字，普遍並不高；另一方面由於經理人多有相當持股，導致經理人較重視股價變動之投資價值。然而，經理人報酬係屬股份有限公司所有權與經營權分離所形成代理成本（agency costs）之一環，且為公司治理良窳之指標之一，實值得加以重視。
不同於國內外文獻多係討論報酬數額過高之問題，本文係就公司經理人報酬之分析乃強調報酬決定過程（process）之公平性，以及如何強化對經理人報酬之監督。
就經理人報酬之決定過程言，我國並未如美國設有報酬委員會（compensation committee）之規定，惟在美國法之實踐下，報酬委員會是否得公平決定經理人之報酬，誠不無疑問。因此，報酬決定權應分配於何機闕，以及決定過程應如何規定，即有研究之必要。同時，為達到資訊之透明性，公司報酬政策（policy）、決定過程與結果亦應有適當之揭露。再者，透過股東、法院以及市場之監督，包括股東對經理人報酬之提案權、股東代表訴訟，以及經由公司控制權市場（market for corporate control）等各種監督機制是否能有效監督經理人報酬，亦為本文討論之重點。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
executive compensation；corporate governance；compensation structure；compensation committee；compensation disclosure；compensation monitoring；shareholder proposal |
| 英文摘要： |
The laws governing executive compensation are quite simple and the relevant discussions on this issue are rare in Taiwan. This might be due to two reasons: first, the pay level of executive compensation in Taiwan is not as surprisingly high as that in the United States, and second, it is common that in Taiwan executives also hold considerable shares in the company; therefore，they regard share price increase more than compensations. However, executive compensation itself is a part of the agency problem and is the acid test of corporate governance. Thus, executive compensation is worthy of our attention and research.
Different from other studies addressing the problem of executives' high pay level, this paper emphasizes on the analysis of the pay setting process and how to effectively monitor and discipline the executive pay.
For the pay setting process, the most important issue is who has the authority to determine the compensation policy, process and pay level. There is no compensation committee in Taiwan. However, from the experience of the United States, compensation committee still suffers from some flaws in reaching arm’s length negotiation and fair compensations. In addition, the compensation policy，pay setting process and result should be adequately disclosed. Furthermore, the various monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, such as shareholder proposal, shareholder approval on stock option, shareholder derivative suit, market for corporate control, to name a few, will also be discussed and analyzed in this paper.
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| 目 次： |
壹、前言
貳、公司治理、代理理論與公司經理人報酬
參、公司經理人報酬之決定機制
一、公司經理人報酬之結構
（一）美國
（二）我國
（三）分析與檢討
二、公司經理人報酬之決定
（一）美國
（三）我國
（三）分析與檢討
肆、公司經理人報酬之監督機制
一、資訊揭露
（一）資訊揭露之重要性
（二）美國資訊揭露之相關規定
（三）我國資訊揭露之相關規定
（四）分析與檢討
二、股東監督
（一）股東提案權
（二）股份選擇權之同意權
（三）修訂辦事細則限制經理人報酬
三、法院監督：股東代表訴訟
四、市場監督
伍、結論
後記
參考文獻
一、中文文獻
三、英文文獻
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