| 中文摘要： |
遺棄罪在我國一向被認為是一種殺人罪的補充規定，在當前的德國，則被解釋為重傷罪的補充規定。所謂補充規定，指的是我們把遺棄罪當作相對於各該實害犯的「故意危險犯」規定，用來處罰這些實害犯規定不能適用，但是仍然已經故意製造了生命或重大健康危險的行為。在此理解之下，遺棄罪在個案上的運用很容易引起一個疑問，即，一個被認為構成遺棄罪的故意危險行為為什麼不同時也構成殺人未遂或重傷未遂？針對這個問題，通說聲稱，遺棄罪所要求的主觀要件是「危險故意」，與殺人未遂或重傷未遂所要求的「實害故意」不同，因此兩造有所區別。然而，這裡所謂「危險故意」和「實害故意」的區別，是很值得懷疑的。因為從通說對「危險」概念的說法，即「危險是發生實害的高度可能性」來看，我們很難真的說「危險故意」和「實害故意」有什麼不同。
如果我們堅持遺棄罪是一種保護生命或身體健康的故意危險犯，如果我們所要求的遺棄故意真的是「對實害發生的高度可能性的故意」，那麼遺棄罪到最後只能被解釋為一種殺人或重傷未遂的特殊類型，而且是刑責減輕的特殊未遂類型。此一結果顯然將使遺棄罪喪失我們最初所期待的補充功能。因此，相反地，如果我們仍然認為遺棄罪應該維持某種殺人罪或重傷罪的補充功能，那麼傳統上「遺棄罪是一種保護生命或身體健康的故意危險犯」這個說法就有修正的必要。
本文認為，關於遺棄罪內涵的重新詮釋大致上有兩個途徑。第一，是把「遺棄故意」轉化解釋為「有認識過失」，亦即，把遺棄罪理解為一種出於過度自信或過度信賴運氣而拿別人生命或健康去冒險的行為。這個轉化解釋有一個更深刻的基礎在於，德國刑法學界在發展「危險故意」概念的時候，自始就混雜了兩種不同的立法脈絡，其中之一原本就應該以「有認識過失」為基準，才能呼應該等立法設定的可罰性基礎，而遺棄罪正好屬於這一類。第二條重新詮釋遺棄罪的途徑，則是把遺棄罪理解為以「保護基本生活福址」為目的的規定，也就是回到德國古老的「義務違反說」下來理解。這條路是事實上我國法院正在走的。本文認為，從我國遺棄罪條文的用字與體系位置來看，同時從比較美國的遺棄罪與不為撫養罪或德國違反撫養義務罪等法律的用字、刑度，以及法院判決來看，這個解釋途徑也是可行並且正當的。
這個問題的處理，到最後是兩種解釋途徑，而且是兩種可行且正當的解釋途徑的選擇。這個選擇沒有對錯問題，它只取決於我們社會對於刑法保護功能的期待到達什麼程度。根據本文的估計，比較可行的方案應該是把遺棄罪仍然解釋為保護重大健康法益的有認識過失犯，另外仿照德國的立法制定違反撫養或照顧義務罪，使我國法院判決認為人的基本生活福址也應受刑法保護的想法，獲得落實。
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| 英文摘要： |
The criminal abandonment in Germany law (Aussetzung; StGB § 221) has been seen as an intentional crime against person, which previously referred only to life and presently to a broader conception of physical safety or health of a person. According to the dominant opinion, both academic and practical therein, the fault or subjective guilt requirement of criminal abandonment is the “intention of concrete endangerment”. ( der konkrete Gefährdungsvorsatz ) That is, the defendant must know that the abandonment would bring the victim into a “concrete risk” of life or bodily safety. What constitutes a problem is that, under such interpretation, the criminal abandonment could only be deemed as a specific type of attempted homicide or attempted physical offence in serious manner. More critically, it could only be deemed as a minor type of those crimes, so that it could lose all the pragmatic functions supposed by the legislators. The same problem comes across us too, since our law is an adoptive one. Such an odd situation urges us to reconsider the dogmatic work of the fault requirement of criminal abandonment.
With this respect, I will first go through the general dogmatic theories pertaining to the distinction between the concept “intention of endangerment” and the intention in principle, which is similar to the controversy between recklessness and intention in Anglo-American law. I will scrutinize the methodologies adopted in these established theories, and contend that there have been diversities in context when German scholars talked about the so called “intention of endangerment”. I assert that the “intention of endangerment” in German criminal law should be divided into two categories, the formal and the substantial one, which parallel to the “inadvertent recklessness” and “advertent recklessness” in Anglo-American law, and the former should be categorized as a “negligence” liability in serious grade. Upon these bases, I will further argue that it is plausible to redefine the fault requirement of the criminal abandonment as formal but not substantial “intention of endangerment”, i.e. as “inadvertent recklessness” （bewußte Fahrlässigkeit）rather than intention in principle, if we still insist that the criminal abandonment law play a pragmatic role in protecting people’s life or physical safety.
On the other hand, the subjective redefining work as mentioned above is not the only way to reserve the pragmatic function of the criminal abandonment. Actually our courts, unlike the German courts, often go beyond the established limits written in books, applying the criminal abandonment to those cases that should be considered absolutely of no danger caused by the abandonment. In other words, our courts have changed our criminal abandonment law into the criminal nonsupport law in German (Verletzung der Unterhaltungspflicht; StGB §§ 170, 171), or the criminal nonsupport or criminal abandonment law in U.S., which are supposed to defend a persons basic living welfare. After tracing the history of the criminal abandonment law in German, and after comparing the wording as well as the location in the criminal law system with the criminal nonsupport law as mentioned, I contend that our courts have plausibly provided an alternative way of interpretation, differing from that written in books, and given our criminal abandonment law a broader pragmatic function than the German’s, and what the courts have done is justifiable.
Since we have now two alternatives in interpreting our criminal abandonment law, and since ether of the two is justifiable, the remaining question of how to choose should depend on the ultimate thinking of our society about how far we would like our criminal law to go. There would not be any right or wrong answer. In my speculation, it might be relatively practical to urge to make a new law like the criminal nonsupport in German, and keep the criminal abandonment law interpreted as an inadvertent recklessness commitment to physical harm.
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| 目 次： |
壹、前言
一、問題的提出
二、研究方法
貳、遺棄罪的立法目的
一、德國法律史的觀察
二、德國學說及其檢視
三、我國的學說及實務狀況
四、小結
參、遺棄罪作為侵害生命或身體法益的「故意危險犯」
一、概說
二、「危險故意」
三、「遺棄故意」的解釋及其問題
四、「遺棄故意」作為有認識過失的解釋及其結果
五、中間結論（之一）—一併考慮生命保護與重大健康保護的選擇
肆、遺棄罪作為保護基本生活福祉的規定
一、概說
二、若干立法例與相關判決
三、解釋可行性與正當性的評估
四、中間結論（之二）
伍、結論
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