法學期刊.
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論著名稱: 股東會與公司治理(The Shareholders’ Meeting and Corporate Governance)
編著譯者: 曾宛如
出版日期: 2010.09
刊登出處: 台灣/國立臺灣大學法學論叢第 39 卷 第 3 期 /109-166 頁
頁  數: 58 點閱次數: 9588
下載點數: 232 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 國立臺灣大學法律學院
關 鍵 詞: 董事會優位主義股東會優位主義股東提案權董事候選人提名制度董事交錯任期制權限劃分股東陳述商業判斷法則
中文摘要: 股東會權限之大小端視公司法制係採行董事會優位主義或股東會優位主義而有不同。然而,不論在何一政策下,股東會均應發揮在該政策下應有之功能。實證經驗上顯示股東會之召開、議程設定及程序進行容易受到董事會之操縱而減損其功能。然而面對此種情境,現行法下所能提供之救濟幾希。
美國德拉瓦州公司法藉由法律與衡平界線之釐清就股東會功能減損之實例給予救濟並提供判斷標準,惟於董事會優位主義下,仍堅持股東決議權與提案權係屬二事。
我國法下,董事會操縱股東會之情形並不稍遜。章程修改不僅是操縱的明證之一,且得到多數法院之支持。事後救濟制度緩不濟急但事前救濟制度,如假處分,其運用之分寸仍未成熟。即使引進股東提案權及董事候選人提名制度,由於對違反之董事,公司法所提供之制裁機制並無實益,故董事或許寧可違法也不願遵守。
凡此種種皆繫於股東會與董事會間權限劃分之釐清;就此方能確定股東會之功能,並針對相關制度提供完整設計及事後救濟。
英文關鍵詞: director primacyshareholder primacyshareholder proposalshareholder director nominationsstaggered boardallocation of power between shareholders and directorsmembers’ statementsbusiness judgment rule
英文摘要: The scope of the power of the shareholders’ meeting depends on the adoption of director primacy or shareholder primacy. However, no matter which one prevails, the shareholders’ meeting should have certain functions under the policy. Practical experience shows that convening a meeting, setting its agenda and conducting the meeting are all subjected to the manipulation of the board of directors. Accordingly, the function of the shareholders’ meeting is diminished.
When faced with this difficulty, there are not many remedies available under the current legislation. Delaware’s courts have endeavored to develop a set of standards to delineate the boundary between law and equity and have thus provided relief for the aggrieved shareholders. Nonetheless, by believing in director primacy, Delaware’s courts insist on the passivity of shareholders’ proposals.
For decades, the board of directors in Taiwan has been inclined to manipulate the procedure of the shareholders’ meeting. The alteration of the
articles of incorporation provides a good example of this scenario. Unfortunately, such manipulation has been well supported by the courts due to the misunderstanding of the true meaning of “setting the agenda”.
The ex post remedies are often too late to repair any damage. Therefore, rules related to shareholder proposals and shareholder director nominations have been introduced into the Company Act to mitigate this situation. However, the law does not give shareholders teeth with which to bite when the rules are breached.
All these issues are related to the way in which power is allocated between the board of directors and the shareholders’ meeting. Only after this has been done, can the functions of the shareholders’ meeting be ascertained and the rules restructured to put things in order.
目  次: 壹、緒論
貳、股東會之運作與干擾
一、「出席」股東會行為之性質
二、股東會運作之干擾:從董事會操控之角度切入
三、董事會操控行為應否准許之判斷標準
四、股東會決議之撤銷與無效
參、公司治理下股東會之功能與設計
一、股東提案權
二、董事之解任及董事候選人提名制度
三、股東會功能之發揮與落實
肆、結論
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