法學期刊
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論著名稱:
論敵意併購下目標公司董事之義務與司法審查標準-我國法與美國法之比較研究
文獻引用
編著譯者: 郭大維
出版日期: 2010.06
刊登出處: 台灣/輔仁法學第 39 期/49-100 頁
頁  數: 51 點閱次數: 2495
下載點數: 204 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 郭大維
關 鍵 詞: 敵意併購董事義務司法審查標準企業併購法公司法
中文摘要: 隨著商業競爭日趨激烈,近年來敵意併購在我國日益活絡。由於敵意併購是在未經目標公司經營團隊之同意下強行併購目標公司,且併購完成後常導致目標公司經營權之更迭,因此目標公司董事在面對敵意併購時,往往會採取防禦措施,來阻礙或對抗此類敵意併購。然而,目標公司董事在抵禦敵意併購時,可能會有為其自身利益而非公司及股東利益之疑慮,故有必要依併購行為之特殊性將董事義務進一步細緻化,並建立一套客觀具體的審查標準來檢視目標公司董事之行為是否違反其義務。
由於敵意併購在我國正處於發展階段,一方面現行法對於目標公司董事在敵意併購下之義務,並不明確。另一方面,有關目標公司董事防禦措施是否違反其義務之判斷,目前似乎仍欠缺一套具體的審查標準。相較於我國,美國因企業併購活動盛行,實務上已累積相當多的案例,並發展出一系列的司法審查標準來檢驗目標公司董事在敵意併購下之行為是否違反其義務。因此,本文期待藉由對美國法之比較研究,可以截長補短,提供我國未來處理此類問題之參考。
英文關鍵詞: hostile takeoversdirectors’ dutiesjudicial review standardsBusiness Merger and Acquisition ActCompany Law
英文摘要: With the competition of the business environment, hostile takeover situations in Taiwan have increased recently. A hostile takeover is a type of corporate takeover which is carried out against the wishes of the board of the target company and often results in the change of corporate control. Accordingly, the board of the target company always takes defensive tactics against it. However, the board of the target company may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders. In light of the board's potential conflicts of interest, there should be an enhanced duty and judicial review is to be somewhat more intrusive. It is necessary to clarify the target company directors' duties under hostile takeovers and to establish a substantive judicial review standard.
Hostile takeovers in Taiwan are at the stage of development. The current Taiwanese laws pertaining to the target company directors' duties under hostile takeovers are not clear and the judicial review standard to examine whether the target company director violates his duties is not well-established. In contrast, the hostile takeovers in the U.S. have existed for many decades and the U.S. has established a series of judicial review standards to examine the target company director's act under a hostile takeover. Consideration of the American experience is helpful in assessing the present Taiwanese system. Therefore, this article attempts to draw lesson from the American experience through a comparative study.
目  次: 壹、前言
貳、美國法關於敵意併購目標公司董事之義務與司法審查標準
一、董事受託義務之內涵與司法審查標準
二、敵意併購下的特殊考量-強化之司法審查
(一)早期:主要目的測試標準
(二)兩階段測試標準
(三)兩階段測試標準之變型
三、小結
參、我國法上之觀察與省思
一、現行法有關董事義務之內涵
二、我國法與美國法之比較
三、本文建議
肆、結論
相關法條:
相關判解:
相關函釋:
相關論著:
郭大維,論敵意併購下目標公司董事之義務與司法審查標準-我國法與美國法之比較研究,輔仁法學,第 39 期,49-100 頁,2010年06月。
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