法學期刊.
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論著名稱: 不執行業務股東兼任經理人者之監察權行使-以請求權基礎之方法探討(On Exercise Power of Audit for Shareholder who does not Conduct Business but is Concurrently a Managerial Officer: Basing on Anspruchsgrundlage to Comment)
編著譯者: 楊君仁
出版日期: 2015.06
刊登出處: 台灣/世新法學第 8 卷 第 2 期 /203-247 頁
頁  數: 25 點閱次數: 1118
下載點數: 100 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 楊君仁
關 鍵 詞: 請求權基礎質詢權查閱權股東資訊權三段論法法律漏洞類推適用資訊拒絕權德國有限公司法
中文摘要: 有限公司不執行業務之股東,均得行使監察權,公司法第 109 條定有明文。但是,如果不執行業務之股東兼任公司經理人,不免具有執行業務之職權,則其監察權是否應受限制,公司法並無任何規定,實值得探討研究。而股東行使監察權,準用第 48 條之規定,得隨時向執行業務之董事質詢公司營業情形,查閱財產文件、帳簿、表冊,但當其出現利益衝突,明顯可能有致公司損害時,是否應仿德國有限公司立法例,公司有拒絕提供資訊之權?本文特以臺灣高等法院 98 年度上字第 1198 號民事判決為例,嘗試以請求權基礎來評析綜論原被告、法院、學者甚或外國立法例之見解,既期掌握現行法解釋適用之可能及其法制不足處,亦可藉法理論說而寄望法官造法,填補漏洞以啟法律續造之功,或者期待立法者適時增修法律以補法制之缺失。
英文關鍵詞: AnspruchsgrundlageShareholder's Information RightsSyl-logism, AnalogyLegal LoopholeDuty of LoyaltyGmbHG
英文摘要: Pursuant to Article 109 of the Taiwan Company Act, the shareholders of a limited company, who do not conduct business, may, from time to time, exercise power of audit. Nevertheless, when a shareholder holds concurrently a managerial officer of the company, should his audit be forbidden? The provision is still not incorporated into the Taiwan Company Act. How could this question of incompatibility be solved? In the performance of shareholder, the provisions in Article 48 shall mutatis mutandis apply to such power of audit. That means shareholders may, at any time, require directors to furnish information on the business condition of the company and examine its assets, documents, books and statement. When there is a conflict of interest for shareholders, does the company have the power to turn down the right like German model. All these questions are fundamental and important. This article therefore tries to review doctrine and court practice. Basing on Anspruchsgrundlage to comment Taiwan High Court 98-Shang-1198 Judgement from de lege lata and de kge ferenda.
目  次: 壹、問題之提出
貳、請求權基礎之法律思維
一、以請求權規範為依據
二、來回注目流轉於大前提與生活事實問
參、以請求權基礎評析法院判決
一、案例事實
二、請求權基礎
肆、結論
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