| 關 鍵 詞： |
轉售價格維持；歐盟競爭法；集體豁免；個別豁免；電子商務；圖書定價銷售制度；搭便車理論；展店理論 |
| 中文摘要： |
最低轉售價格維持具有正面及促進競爭效果，包括解決搭便車問題，以及展店理論等，其也被美國最高法院 2007 年 Leegin 案所肯定。相對於美國，歐盟至今仍將最低轉售價格維持視為核心限制，排除於集體豁免規則之適用，也很難符合 TFEU 第 101 條第 3 項的個別豁免。歐盟執委會在 2018 年 7 月 24 日，對 4 家消費電器製造廠商，包括華碩等公司在內開罰，認為這 4 家公司對網路商店的轉售價格限制，違反歐盟競爭法。就裁罰結論來看，歐盟執委會維持一貫看法，維持最低轉售價格原則上屬於 TFEU 第 101 條第 1 項的核心限制，推定有反競爭效果，且不適用之集體豁免規則的集體豁免，而在該案也不適用 TFEU 第 101 條第 3 項的個別豁免。這樣的發展，一方面有助於網路商店的比價戰爭，讓消費者買到更便宜的商品。但另方面，電子商務發展下，網路零售商的低價競爭，確實嚴重衝擊了實體零售商的生存空間，其不僅是過去討論的服務搭便車問題，而是更根本的影響了實體零售商的存活，屬於展店理論問題。實體零售商萎縮，進而會影響製造商的整體銷售量。本文最後也將提出，或許存在幾種轉售價格維持的替代方案，但面對網路零售商的低價競爭，新的替代方案也有法規與現實上的困境。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
Resale Price Maintenance；EU Competition Law；Block Exemption；Individual Exemption；E-commerce；Fixed Book Price；Free-riding Theory；Outlets Theory |
| 英文摘要： |
Resale-price-maintenance (RPM) has both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects in relation to solving the free-riding theory and outlets theory. The U.S. Supreme Court in the Leegin case (2007) acknowledged the free-riding theory. Compared with the U.S., the EU views the lowest resale-price-maintenance as a hardcore restriction in the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, and is not exempt from the prohibition. Furthermore, it is very difficult for RPM to fit the requirements of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. On July 24, 2018, the EU commission sanctioned four consumer electronics manufacturers, including ASUS, for implementing their resale-price-maintenance policy against their online retailers, which was therefore deemed to be a violation of EU competition law by the EU Commission. From these sanctions we can see that the EU commission has maintained a consistent position whereby the lowest resale-price-maintenance is categorized as a hardcore restriction according to Article 101(1), is presumed to have an anti-competitive effect, which is not suited to the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, and also does not give rise to much possibility for qualifying the requirements of the individual exemption of Article 101(3). This position is beneficial to the low-price war between online retailers, and thereby allows consumers to buy cheap products. However, on the other hand, under this Ecommerce development, the low-price competition by online retailers deprives bricks-and-mortar retailers of the space to survive. This phenomenon, which has less to do with free-riding theory, and more to do with outlets theory, is related to the survival of bricks-and-mortar retailers. While the number of bricks-and-mortar retailers has decreased, the overall number of manufacturers’ products sold has also declined. Finally, several alternatives to RPM are discussed, but there are still obstacles both from the legal and practical aspects.
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| 目 次： |
一、前言
二、轉售價格維持的促進競爭效果
（一）轉售價格維持的正面及促進競爭效果
（二）美國 Leegin 案對轉售價格維持正面效果的論述
三、歐盟轉售價格維持相關規範
（一）TFEU 第 101 條
（二）集體豁免與個別豁免
（三）垂直限制指導原則
（四）建議或最高轉售價格
四、圖書定價銷售制度與案例
（一）1981 年 VBBB/VBVB 案
（二）1988 年英國出版協會案
（三）思考
五、歐盟對華碩網路轉售價格維持裁罰案
（一）華碩案
（二）程序
（三）法律論述
（四）評析
六、電子商務興起的衝擊
（一）網路零售商對實體零售商的衝擊
（二）轉售價格維持之替代方法
七、結論
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