| 關 鍵 詞： |
Revlon Duty；Revlon/QVC Doctrine；企業併購；受任人義務；其他利害關係人；ESG |
| 中文摘要： |
企業併購追求併購雙方交易完成後能有綜效的產生，併購交易過程因為會涉及股東、高階主管乃至其他利害關係人在交易完成後的權利是否受到影響，因此，德拉瓦州法院在多年的審判實務中，除了對敵意併購時目標公司採取防禦措施之手段適法性建立了 Unocal/Unitrin Doctrine 之審查標準外，對於公司控制權出售或公司拆解型的併購交易，也透過多個判決建立了 Revlon/QVC Doctrine 之審查標準，惟上述二種審查標準基本上都不涉及其他利害關係人權益保障之問題，因此併購交易時，其他利害關係人之保障是否屬於傳統的經營判斷原則內可以涵蓋的問題，就有解釋空間。雖然受任人義務已經在公司法及其他相關法令入法多年，企業併購法也已施行多年，但我國民事法院涉及受任人義務的判決仍然未能建立足夠清晰的審查標準，而企業併購交易涉訟的受任人義務判決數量也還不足以建立審查體系，因此本文以比較法的觀點，引用美國德拉瓦州判決及學術文獻，做為我國司法審查標準建立的參考。
金融業係受到高度監理的產業，其中壽險業因為涉及相當長尾的壽險保單及或有負債（保險事故發生與否不確定），因此壽險業的財務健全性與長期清償能力監理更是複雜，而此種長期清償能力法規之目的就是保障股東、勞工、高階主管以外的其他利害關係人—債權人，而若吾人觀察我國壽險公司資產負債表數字當可得知，負債與股東權益的比率是相當大的落差，股東權益只占很小的比率，因此壽險公司的經營健全與否對龐大的要保人／被保險人群體之影響，比對股東的影響更鉅大。因此當一家壽險公司／金控公司在健全經營的狀態下要進行併購交易時，或許問題較為單純，可以回歸參考德拉瓦州判決以經營判斷原則或 Revlon/QVC Doctrine，作為併購交易時賣方公司董事會之行為是否滿足受任人義務之審查標準，當然依據我國公司法第 1 條第 2 項之規定，也可以採行增進公共利益之行為，以善盡其社會責任；但是當賣方公司係因為長期清償能力有問題，而不得不對外求售時，除了股東權利應該考慮之外，其他利害關係人－債權人的保險契約權利如何保障，亦即賣方如何選擇一家更適合或更有能力保障債權人的買方公司，應該是主管機關也是賣方公司所應該側重的爭點，本文認為此時賣方公司董事會應該對龐大的要保人／被保險人群體，負有更高的義務，而非以股東利益為優先考慮。本文以 2024 年間，我國新光金控與台新金控的併購交易為例，探討賣方公司董事會在併購交易過程中之受任人義務與交易對象之選擇對債權人權益影響的可能性，希望對於壽險公司併購交易時的受任人義務行為標準提出一些建議與看法。
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| 英文關鍵詞： |
Revlon Duty；Revlon/QVC Doctrine；Merger and Acquisition；Fiduciary Duty；Other Constituency；ESG |
| 英文摘要： |
The synergy generated after the consummation is the purpose of both parties in a M&A transaction. A M&A deal will not only involve issues of whether the rights of shareholders, senior managers, but alos the rights of other constituencies will be affected. For years, Delaware court in addition to the Unocal/Unitrin Doctrine to review the legality of defensive measures adopted by the target board, the Court have established Revlon/QVC Doctrine to review the “change of control” or “sale of the corporate” transaction. However, both of the review standards mentioned above do not involve the protection of the other constituencies in any given cases. Therefore, it remains as an unresolved issue: does the protection of the other constituencies fall into the traditional BJR scope? Although the fiduciary duties had been adopted into the Company Act and other relevant laws for many years, and the Enterprise Merger and Acquisition Act has been enacted and implemented for years; however, a systematic judicial review standard still under development in Taiwan. Moreover, the fiduciary duties review standards involved in M&A transactions remain unclear due to the small number of cases and decisions made by the Court. Thus, this article will from a perspective of comparative law cite Delaware cases and academic literature as a reference for building up the review standard in our judicial system.
The financial industries are highly regulated. Among which, due to the long-tail nature and contingent liabilities in life insurance policies, the regulatory oversight of life insurance companies regarding their soundness of financial conditions and long-term solvency capability are complicated. The purpose of such solvency regulations is to protect “other constituencies”- the policyholders and creditors but not for shareholders, labors, senior management. When a M&A deal is negotiated between or among financially sound holding companies/life insurance companies, the issues are relatively simple and easy for the regulatory authority and the courts, this article suggest that we can use the Delaware
Doctrines to review any given deals. However, when a financially troubled financial institute/life insurance company is a party as a target/seller in the transaction, we must shift our focus from the protection of shareholders to the protection of other constituencies- the policyholders and creditors. The board of directors and senior management of the target company are supposed and should seek a transaction with a buyer which has a better capability and long-term operation performance to bail or pull the target from troublesome situation and the purpose of the M&A transaction is to protect the other constituencies. The article argued that the regulatory agency and the courts should put this purpose into their review process when the fiduciary duties issues are raised. This article
utilized the case study of 2024 Shin-Kong Financial Holding Co. Ltd and Taishin Holding Co. Lid. to explore the fiduciary duties of the board of directors of the target company and the possibility of the impact of creditors in accordance with the choice of counterparts and to furnish suggestions and recommendations regarding the fiduciary duties in M&A deals of life insurance.
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| 目 次： |
壹、楔子－代前言
貳、公司出售構成控制權改變時之股東最大利益原則
一、德拉瓦州 Revlon/QVC Doctrine 股東最佳價格之適用條件
二、最高價格或最佳價格之審查標準
參、Revlon/QVC Duty 與我國企業併購法第 5 條規定之解釋
一、企業併購法第 5 條第 1 項規定之變革
二、企業併購時 ESG 項目之考量與評估
三、新光金控併購交易與其他利害關係人權益問題
肆、併購交易中利益衝突的防免機制
一、德拉瓦州公司法安全港條款
二、美國 ALI 公司治理原則
三、證交法下特設控制權變動獨立董事會（Change of Control Board）
伍、新光金控 2024 併購交易董事受任人義務之檢視
一、新光人壽、台新人壽、台灣人壽重要經營數據統計
二、新光金控、台新金控、中信金控重要經營數據統計
三、新光台新金控大股東利害關係狀
四、是真愛還是別有考慮？
陸、結論
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